This follows immediately from exp ( e max X) = and 1 + 1 2 = c.
Proof of Corollary 2. For T > X, an equilibrium with private information exists in which e ;priv (t) = 0 for t < T X and e ;priv (t) = e max for t T X. In the unique equilibrium with public information e ;pub (t) = e max if and only if t T . We show that X > by contradiction. By de…nition, X is the deadline T solving 
which implies that exerting e¤ort to produce a second breakthrough is socially ine¢ cient. We now show that when this inequality holds, welfare under public information exceeds the welfare under private information for short deadlines, V Hence, this implies that X > , which is a contradiction. To establish the inequality (2), we use that for T , App. 1
Using exp ( 2 e max T ) = (T ) 2 , we …nd that higher welfare is achieved in the public information case if
2 e max 1 (T ) 2 .
Rearranging, we …nd 2 c 2 2 e max (1 (T ))
The term
(T )
emax corresponds to the expected duration of a game with maximum length T when the project is implemented at the rate e max and is thus smaller than T . Hence, the right-hand side has a positive sign. Moreover, from inequality (1), we know that the left-hand side has a negative sign. This establishes the inequality.
Proof of Corollary 3. Knowing that T < implies T < X by Corollary 2, this follows immediately from the second part of the proof of that Corollary.
Proof of Corollary 4. The condition (2 2 c) e max < implies that it is socially e¢ cient for the team to produce only one breakthrough. The e¢ cient level of the value of the project is thus bounded above by V 0 + 1 . However, for T 2 [X; Y ], the expected value of the project equals V 0 + 1 2 ( 1 + 2 ) + 2 1 (V 0 + 1 ). When (1 ) 2 , this exceeds V 0 + 1 .
B.2 Large E¤ort Incentives ( d )
In this section, we describe the case where e¤ort incentives are large ( d , see Section 6.1) in more detail. We also state the equilibrium strategies and beliefs formally and provide a proof.
We consider deadlines of di¤erent length T of which there are four distinct cases. We de…ne two thresholds X d and Y d , similar to X and Y , and an additional threshold Z. The threshold X d denotes the length of time necessary such that an agent exerting maximum e¤ort is successful with probability 1 d . Thus, the threshold solves exp ( e max X d ) = d .
Similarly, the threshold Y d denotes the length of time that an agent would be willing to delay implementation in exchange for the additional bene…t of a second breakthrough with probability 1 d . Thus, the threshold solves
The characterization of the equilibrium is very similar as before, with the exception of a …nal stage which lasts up to Z for games with length exceeding X d . Once the length of the game exceeds X d and unsuccessful agents have exerted maximum e¤ort until t = X d , successful players will implement projects at a rate d (t) such that 1 d d (t) = e max keeping the belief constant at d . The threshold Z is the maximum length of this mixing stage which maintains maximum incentives to exert e¤ort throughout the game, Z = 1 2 e max log( 1
).
Proposition 8. If d
, then the equilibrium strategies and beliefs are as follows: i) If T X d , any successful player chooses not to implement, d (t) = 0, for all t while any unsuccessful player chooses to exert maximum e¤ ort, e (t) = e max , for all t. The agents' beliefs evolve according to (t) = exp ( e max t). ii) If X d < T X d + Z, any successful player chooses not to implement for t < X d and decides to implement at the mixing rate d (t) = ( emax) for t X d . Any unsuccessful player chooses to exert maximum e¤ ort, e (t) = e max , for all t. The agents'beliefs evolve according to (t) = exp ( e max t) for t X d and (t) = d for t > X d :
iii) If X d + Z < T Y d + Z, any successful agent chooses not to implement for t < t d T Z, and decides to implement at the mixing rate d (t) = ( emax) 2 2 emax 2 for t t d . Any unsuccessful player chooses to exert e¤ ort e (t) for 0 t < t d which is not uniquely determined, but the e¤ ort choice must satisfy the following conditions:
and
for t 0 = 0. For t t d the unsuccessful agent exerts maximal e¤ ort e (t) = e max . The agents' beliefs evolve according to for t t d . Any unsuccessful agent chooses to exert e¤ ort e (t) = c for t < t d Y d , and to exert e¤ ort e (t) for t d Y d t < t d which is not uniquely determined but must satisfy the following conditions (3) and (7) for t 0 = t d Y d , and to exert maximal e¤ ort e (t) = e max for t t d .
The proof is here exactly the same as for Case 1 in Proposition 1, since d = exp ( e max X d ) > in this case with large e¤ort incentives.
ii) Case 2:
We again start by writing out the implied continuation values of successful and unsuccessful agents on the equilibrium path for the proposed equilibrium strategies.
At the deadline, the continuation values equal
and thus the mixing strategy is an equilibrium strategy. Strategy of unsuccessful player: Check that the unsuccessful agent's choice of e¤ort e (t) = e max is optimal by noting that
The argument that an unsuccessful agent will not decide to implement is again the same as in Case 1 of Proposition 1. The expected utility when following the equilibrium strategy exceeds the expected utility when exerting no e¤ort, but delaying implementation, which exceeds the expected utility of implementing the project immediately.
iii) Case 3:
Notice …rst that the subgames for t T Z are identical to those described above in case 2 for t X d and the proof is identical. Turning to t < T Z. For t 2 [0; T Z], the continuation value for the successful individual is
and for the unsuccessful agent
Hence, the di¤erence equals
Strategy of successful player: This corresponds to the proof in Case 2 of Proposition 1. Check that the successful individual's decision strategy d (t) = 0 is optimal by noting that V S (t)
, which is true given the equilibrium e¤ort strategy speci…ed.
Strategy of unsuccessful player: Check that the unsuccessful agent is indi¤erent about the level of exerted e¤ort for all t 2 [0;
c . An unsuccessful agent will not implement the project provided that
We know from the successful player's strategy that
Hence, it remains to show that
which is true because 1 + 1 2 = c and
Here again we note that all subgames starting from t = T Y d + Z are encompassed by the proof of Case 3 above, and the continuation values at t = T Y d + Z are
which are exactly the same continuation values as in Case 3 of Proposition 1 for t = T Y: In this case the strategies and the proof for the subgames t < T (Y d + Z) are identical to that for Case 3 of Proposition 1 for t < T Y .
For T < X d , the equilibrium strategies are exactly like before. For T X d , the marginal value of a breakthrough at and close to the deadline is strictly greater than c , unlike in the small incentives case. This also continues to be the case for all longer deadlines. As the length of the game T increases, however, the incentives for e¤ort at a given time decrease. To see this, consider the incentives for e¤ort at t = 0 which are given by
The only part of the expression which changes with T , is V U (X d ) since all the other terms above are constants and
This is a weighted sum of the expected payo¤ conditional on either producing a breakthrough or the other agent implementing the project prior to the deadline and the payo¤ from being unsuccessful at the deadline. Both of these payo¤s are independent of T and it is only the relative likelihood of each which is a¤ected by T . The likelihood of being unsuccessful at the deadline exp ( 2 e max (T X d )) decreases in T . Hence, the continuation value of being unsuccessful at X d is increasing in T . There exists a deadline
and an agent is indi¤erent about exerting e¤ort at t = 0, so
, that is case iii) above, maximal e¤ort by unsuccessful agents can no longer be sustained throughout the entire game. In equilibrium, an unsuccessful agent reduces her average e¤ort intensity before
, while the successful agent fully delays. For T larger than Y d + Z, successful agents will no longer prefer to delay their implementation decision at the beginning of the game, exactly as in the case with small incentives.
B.3 Uniqueness
In this section, we prove uniqueness of our proposed equilibrium. We …rst provide a more general description of our model and then state a sequence of lemmas that we use to prove Proposition 3 which establishes the uniqueness of our equilibria described in Proposition 2 and Proposition 8.
B.3.1 General Model Description
To establish uniqueness we introduce some additional notation that describes the agents'strategies. De…ne the decision strategy of the unsuccessful agent by (t) which is the conditional probability of implementing a project with no breakthroughs produced by time t given that the other agent does not implement prior to t. De…ne the decision strategy of the successful agent by (t) as the conditional probability of implementing the project with one breakthrough produced by time t given that the other agent does not implement prior to t. De…ne e (t) as the e¤ort strategy of the unsuccessful agent. De…ne (t) as the conditional probability of being unsuccessful by time t given that the other agent does not implement prior to t. Hence, 1 (t) is the conditional probability of being successful by that time. (t) changes over time according to
The e¤ort strategy of the unsuccessful agent in ‡uences We will use the notation~(tilde) to denote the strategies of the other player and (star) to denote equilibrium strategies. The Bayesian belief (t) at a time t that the other agent is unsuccessful conditional on the project not being implemented prior to that time is
A strategy for an agent maps into a path for e (t) ; (t) ; (t) ; (t). We restrict our attention to strategies which result in piecewise continuously di¤erentiable functions of e (t), (t), (t) and (t). Clearly, given the nature of the model 0 since deciding to implement the project is irreversible. The upper bound on e (t) also ensures that (t) is continuous.
We have assumed that (t) and (t) are continuous and di¤erentiable at all but a …nite number of points. Denote the set of points where the strategy is discontinuous by = ft 1 ; :::t g, = ft 1 ; :::t g ;~ = t 1 ; :::t ~ , = t 1 ; :::
These are non-zero only at points in and respectively and represent the probability that a decision to implement at that moment conditional on the other agent not implementing the project prior to that time. The objective function of the agent is: max e(t); (t); (t)
where~ (t) ;~ (t) ;~ (t) denote the strategy of the other player. To simplify notation we will continue using the de…nition of (t) =~
We are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria of the model so strategies must be an equilibrium for all subgames starting at each time t. We describe these by writing out the problem in terms of continuation values for the successful V S (t) and unsuccessful agent V U (t) upon reaching time t. Also, write~ (sjt)~ (sjt) for the perceived probabilities that a successful and unsuccessful agent implement the project at s t given the agent is at t. At on-equilibrium times these are~ (sjt) =~
1 ~ (t) . However, if an o¤-equilibrium time is reached then this is no longer the case and separate equilibrium strategies and beliefs must be speci…ed for these subgames. As we will show below the set of symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria we focus on involve all times being reached with positive probability.
The continuation value of being successful is just the payo¤ from implementing the optimal stopping policy b t from that moment forward:
is the optimizer or set of optimizers of equation 5. The implementation decision strategy is optimal provided that:
and these conditions ensure satis…es the adding up constraint:
The payo¤ from being unsuccessful is de…ned by a joint e¤ort and stopping problem given by:
is the optimizer or set of optimizers of equation 6. The condition for the e¤ort strategy pro…le to be an equilibrium satis…es e (t) = arg max
and the implementation decision strategy is an equilibrium provided that
wheret (t) solves (6) the unsuccessful agent's e¤ort and stopping problem. These conditions also ensure that it satis…es the adding up constraint Ẑ
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium may be described by a tuple (e (t) ; (t) ; (t) ; (t)) if (t) + (t) < 1 for all t < T , where (t) is the Bayesian belief an agent has at time t that the other agent is unsuccessful conditional on the project not having been implemented prior to that time. If 9t 0 < T : (t 0 ) + (t 0 ) = 1 then it must also include o¤-equilibrium strategies and beliefs (e (rjt) ; (rjt) ; (rjt) ; (rjt)) for all times t where (t) + (t) = 1 which themselves are equilibria of those subgames, where (rjt) is the Bayesian belief an agent has at time r that the other agent is unsuccessful conditional on no project implementation prior to that time in a subgame starting at time t. We now rule out some types of decision strategies at on-equilibrium times by the unsuccessful agent. The following lemma rules out a continuously increasing (t).
Lemma 1. @ (t) ; r > 0; " > 0 :
Proof. Suppose not and 9 (t) :
. If an unsuccessful agent weakly prefers to implement then a successful agent strictly prefers to implement hence
and (t) = 1 for t 2 (r "; r)
if not then 9r 0 > t such that
This can be rewritten as 2 6 6 4
However, if this inequality holds then an unsuccessful agent could do strictly better by delaying implementation until r 0 since the comparison of payo¤s would result in the same expression except with 1 replacing 2 . The inequality would then be strict and this would be a contradiction of the unsuccessful agent mixing at t. Hence, (t) = 1 for t 2 (r "; r). However, if (t) = 1 then an uniformed agent can do strictly better by delaying implementation and exerting e¤ort e max over a period of time since e max 1 > ce max + by assumption.
The following lemma rules out a jump in the implementation decision function (t) at a time on the equilibrium path as long as that jump does not occur when both types, successful and unsuccessful, decide to implement with certainty at that instant. by the same reasoning as before. Hence, an unsuccessful agent at s can do better than deciding to implement immediately by delaying and putting in e¤ort since e max 1 > ce max + by assumption.
The only equilibria involving D (s) > 0 also have (s) + (s) = 1 whereby beliefs at times later than s are o¤ the equilbrium path. In this case it may be possible to support unsuccessful agents implementing the project with appropriately speci…ed o¤-equilibrium-path beliefs. However, we will exclude this type of equilibrium as we feel for all intents and purposes that it is equivalent to imposing a deadline at time s. We thus continue the analysis under the assumption that (t) = 0 for all t. This also means that all times are reached on the equilibrium path. The following lemma rules out jumps in the implementation decision function of the successful type (t).
Proof. We proceed with a proof by contradiction. Say there is an equilibrium with a mass point at a time tŵ here a mass of D (t^) = (1 (t^)) > 0 decisions to implement are made. For this to be the case then < 1. If = 1 (t) = (t) successful agents may only decide to implement at the rate at which unsuccessful agents are becoming successful. Consider lim t!t^ e (t) and lim t!t^+ e (t). For there to be a mass point the following conditions need to hold for an agent not to implement the project earlier or later:
The …rst of these inequalities implies that a successful agent will be willing not to implement in the neighborhood immediately prior to t^. The second guarantees that a successful agent cannot do better by waiting at time t^. Also note that lim t!t^+ (t^) > lim t!t^ (t^) due to the mass point. This implies there is a discontinuous change in the e¤ort level at t^if the above two conditions are to be satis…ed. We show that this cannot be maintained in equilibrium. We can write the continuation value from being unsuccessful at time t = t^ t as:
Where t may always be chosen small enough such that there are no other points of discontinuity of (t) for t 2 [t^ t; t^+ t] other than at t = t^. Now consider moving a unit of e¤ort from t^ " to t^+" by augmenting the strategy e (t) as follows:
The strategies are piecewise continuous so we can always …nd a t such that they are continuous over the intervals [t t; t) and (t; t + t]. Using a Taylor series expansion
De…ne the right-hand side by R then
Hence, there exists t > 0 such that this change in strategy is pro…table which is a contradiction that the original e¤ort e (t) is optimal and can be part of an equilibrium.
This along with the earlier lemmas that unsuccessful individuals do not decide to implement implies that (t), (t) and (t) are all continuous.
Lemma 4. V S (t) is continuous.
Proof. The continuity of (t), (t) and (t) ensures that
is continuous in t by the theorem of the maximum (Berge 1963).
Lemma 5. V U (t) is continuous.
Proof. The continuity of (t), (t) and (t) ensures that Lemma 6. Suppose (t) and e (t) constitute equilibrium strategies and 9s; s > 0 :
Proof. We use the relation d (t) (1 (t)) =
The incentives for delaying rather than implementing are equal if the agent is mixing, that is
This can be rearranged to obtain
Apply a Taylor series expansion to (t + t) and exp
and apply it also to exp
We combine these expressions and denote the expression inside of the brackets on the right-hand side by R = (t) (t + t) exp
Simplifying this expression yields
Denote the left-hand side by L and apply a Taylor series expansion:
Equating the t terms from the left-and right-hand sides leads one to conclude that = ẽ (t) (t) 2
The indi¤erence condition implies ẽ (t) (t) 2 = whend (t) > 0 for all t:
Lemma 7. Suppose (t), e (t) and (t) constitute equilibrium strategies and beliefs, and 9s; s > 0 :
Proof. Suppose not. This implies e (t) < e max , (t) > d from lemma 6. The following condition must hold
for e¤ort to be optimal. Hence, we also require
since this is true for all s. Recall
since the agent is indi¤erent about which level of e¤ort to exert we can write it out assuming e i (t) = 0: We can further calculate
Lemma 8.
Proof. Suppose 9 t : t < d then 9 t > 0 : (s) < d for s 2 t t; t . However, this is a contradiction as a successful player will strictly prefer to implement for all s 2 t t; t and hence t > d which is a contradiction that 9 t : t < d . Suppose 9 t : t < then 9 t > 0 : t t < . This implies an upper bound on the value of information is 1 t 2 + t 1 . Thus, for any time s such that (s) < ) e (s) = 0 therefore d (s) ds = 0 so lim r! t > t which is a violation of the continuity of (t). This is a contradiction given the upper bound on the arrival rate of information.
Lemma 9. Suppose e (t) < e max for some t then under large incentives (T ) = d and under small incentives
. Lett = inf ftje (t) < e max g. Being successful at timet has a continuation value given by V S t = V 0 + 1 + (1 (T )) 2 T t since the optimal strategy for a successful individual is to delay until the deadline which is due to e (t) = e max and (t) > d for t t . The continuation value for the unsuccessful individual is
Thus, incentives for e¤ort are given by
Further, by de…nition of d and .we have
and by the continuity of V S and V U 9! > 0 : e t ! = e max which is a contradiction oft = inf ftje (t) < e max g :
The previous lemmas restrict the set of potential equilibria to those where (t) is continuous, decreasing and bounded below by max d ; . Furthermore, if implementation decisions are taken prior to the deadline, then 
B.3.2 Proof for Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria Set for Large Incentives Case
De…ne V S (t) and V U (t)
exp ( 2 e max (T t))
Note that
Hence,
Lemma 10. The unique equilibrium strategies in any subgame starting at t with beliefs (t) Given that e (s) = e max for r b s then the unique implementation decision strategy is
since the only belief at which a successful individual will implement is = d when the unsuccessful agent is exerting maximum e¤ort. We can therefore write the continuation values as V S (b s; ) and V U (b s; ). The contradiction now comes from noting that for t > T Z t d ( ) and V S (t; ) V U (t; ) > c . Therefore, 9 : V S (r; (r)) V U (r; (r)) > c and e (r) < e max for r 2 [b s ; b s) which means e (r) is not an equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 11. Suppose T X d + Z, then an upper bound on (t) is given by
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Now s > T Z t d ( (s)) and thus the unique equilibrium of the subgame starting from (s; (s)) is given by Lemma 10. However, the Bayesian belief b (r) in this subgame reaches
where (s) =
< 1. Thus, r < t and b (t 0 ) > (t 0 ) and hence (t 0 ) is not part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Together with lemma 8 this uniquely determines
Lemma 12. Suppose T X d + Z then a lower bound on (t) is given by
Proof. Lemma 11 and lemma 8 pin down
there is an immediate contradiction as successful individuals would strictly prefer to implement the project immediately. If not then using lemma 7 if d (t) > 0 for s t < T Z then e (t) = e max ; (t) = d ; d (t) = 2 2 2 for t 2 [r; T Z]. However in this case we also have a contradiction as V S (t) V U (t) = V S (t) V U (t) < c since t < T Z and the e¤ort strategy e (t) = e max is not optimal and cannot be part of an equilibrium.
These two lemmas provide an upper and lower bound on the values of (t) in equilibrium. The proof for uniqueness now proceeds by showing that the only equilibrium strategies which support values of between these bounds are the ones given in the propositions.
Proof. i) Case 1: T < X d
Strategy of successful player: d (t) = 0 for all t. Strategy of unsuccessful player: e (t) = e max for all t. Beliefs:
(t) = exp ( e max t) for all t. ii) Case 2:
for t X d . Strategy of unsuccessful player: e (t) = e max for all t. Beliefs:
(t) = exp ( e max t) for t < X d .and for t < T Z and e (t) = e max for all t T Z. Beliefs: (t) = exp R t 0 e (s) ds for t < T Z and
Lemmas 10, 12 and 11 determine the bounds on (t) and that (t) = d ; e (t) = e max for t T Z: Lemma 7 implies that d (t) = 0 for t < T Z which su¢ ces along with the earlier lemmas for the equilibrium strategy set.
iv) Case 4:
for t T Z. Strategy of unsuccessful player: d (t) = 0 for all t. e (t) = c for 0 t T Y d Z and e (t) satis…es
for T Y d Z < t < T Z and e (t) = e max for t T Z. Beliefs:
and (t) = d for t T Z. Case 3 above covers the subgames for t > T Z b
T . It remains to show that the above strategies are unique for t T Z b T : For t T Z b T we have shown that (t) = 1. First, rule out that e (t) = 0. If this were the case the continuation payo¤s would be V S (t) = V 0 + 1 and V U (t) = V 0 + 1 c t t wherẽ t = inf fs > t : e (s) > 0g, therefore the strategy e (t) = 0 is not optimal as V S V U > c : Implying that 0 < e (t) 2 and individuals decide to implement immediately. We have
We therefore require that e (t) = c :
B.3.3 Proof for Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria Set for Baseline Case
De…ne t e ( ) = 1 ln
as well as
Lemma 13. The unique equilibrium strategy in any subgame starting at t with beliefs (t) such that t T t e ( ) is e (s) = e max for t s T and d (s) = 0:
Proof. Suppose 9s t; " > 0 such that e (r) < e max for r 2 [s "; s). If this is the case, we can check the continuation values at b s where b s = sup frje (r) < 1g :
Given that e (r) = e max for r b s then the unique decision strategy is d (r) = 0 since the only belief at which a successful individual will decide to implement is d < when the unsuccessful agent is exerting maximum e¤ort. We can therefore write the continuation values as V ; b s) which means that e (r) is not an equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 14. Suppose T X, then an upper bound on (t) is given by
Now s > T t e ( (s)), so the unique equilibrium of the subgame starting from (s; (s)) is given by Lemma 14. However, the Bayesian belief b (r) in this subgame reaches b (r) = (t 0 ) at r = (T X) + 1 emax ln
Thus, r < t 0 and b (t 0 ) > (t 0 ) and hence (t 0 ) is not part of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
This uniquely determines (T ) = for T X:
Lemma 15. Suppose T X then a lower bound on (t) is given by
If this is the case then using lemma 7 d (t) = 0 for t 2 [s; T ] and there is an immediate contradiction as successful individuals will strictly prefer to implement at s than wait until T .
These lemmas provide an upper and lower bound on the values of (t) in equilibrium. As before, the proof for uniqueness now proceeds by showing that the only equilibrium strategies which support values of between these bounds are the ones given in the propositions.
Proof. i) Case 1: T < X
Strategy of successful player: d (t) = 0 for all t. Strategy of unsuccessful player: d (t) = 0 for all t and e (t) = e max for all t. Beliefs: Beliefs evolve according to (t) = exp R t 0 e (s) ds for all t. This follows immediately from Lemma 13. ii) Case 2: X < T < Y Strategy of successful player: d (t) = 0 for all t. Strategy of unsuccessful player: d (t) = 0 for all t and e (t) satis…es Beliefs: Beliefs evolve according to (t) = exp R t 0 e (s) ds for all t.
Lemma 7 and (T ) = (as shown above from Lemmas 13 and 14) imply that d (t) = 0 for all t. The restriction on e (t) comes from Lemma 15. Beliefs are given by Bayesian updating.
iii) Case 3: T > 1 (1 ) 2 Strategy of successful player: d (t) = implement for t < T Y and d (t) = 0 for t T Y Strategy of unsuccessful player: d (t) = 0 for all t and e (t) = c for t < T Y . e (t) satis…es for t T Y . Beliefs: (t) = 1 for t < T Y and (t) = exp R t 0 e (s) ds for t T Y . The proof for Case 2 encompasses the subgames for t T Y . The uniqueness for t < T Y is completely analogous to the proof in case 4 for large incentives of the uniqueness of equilibrium strategies for t < T Y d Z.
B.4 Modes of Communication
In this section, we provide an explicit characterization of the setup and the results when relaxing our assumptions about the value of breakthroughs and the modes of communication as discussed in Section 6.2.
B.4.1 Setup
We assume that an individual is prepared to exert e¤ort for a second breakthrough, 2 > c + emax . We also assume that an individual is prepared to delay implementation if the other player is exerting maximum e¤ort to produce a third breakthrough, 3 e max > ; and that this is no longer true for a fourth breakthrough, 4 e max < . From a modeling standpoint it is also reasonable to draw a distinction between implementing the project and communicating that a breakthrough has been produced. Hence we allow agents to reveal at each instance that they have produced a breakthrough without implementing the project. We denote this action by w i (t; n i ) : [0; T ] f0; 1; 2g ! f0; 1; :::; n i g where n i denotes the breakthrough an agent has produced. We restrict this to be non-decreasing such that an agent may only reveal that a breakthrough was produced but cannot subsequently conceal this having previously revealed it. To simplify notation we also assume that if the other agent has revealed a breakthrough, w i = 1 then the action w i is no longer available. Common knowledge about the production of 2 breakthroughs will lead to a decision in a similar way to common knowledge of the production of a single breakthrough in the earlier model would also lead to a decision. Hence in the event that the other agent has previously announced the production of a breakthrough then announcing and deciding to implement are equivalent for an agent.
The history of the game at a given point in time is given by ( ; ). 2 f0; 1; 2g indicates whether no breakthrough has been announced, = 0, or if one has been announced which player announced it, = 1; 2. 
B.4.2 Short Deadline
We …rst consider a short deadline. The equilibrium exhibits no revelation of private information about successful breakthroughs, w i (t; n i ) = 0, no decisions on the equilibrium path prior to the deadline, maximum e¤ort by agents who have only produced one or two breakthroughs and zero e¤ort by those who have produced two breakthroughs.
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Proposition 9. 9T > 0 such that a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is w i (t; n i ) = 0 d i (t; n i ; ; ) = implement if 2 f1; 2g 0 otherwise e i (t; n i ; ; ) = 0 if 2 f1; 2g or n i 2 e max otherwise i (t; ; ) = f0; 0; 1g if 2 f1; 2g fexp( e max t); e max t exp( e max t); 1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)g otherwise.
Proof. De…ne V i (t; n i ; ; ) as the continuation value for an agent at time t depending on the breakthrough they have produced and the history of announcements of breakthroughs by themselves and the other agent. De…ne (n i ) as
This is the expected value of the project at the deadline conditional on an agent having n i breakthroughs in equilibrium. Note that for n i = 1; 2 and T <X,
The potential histories in the game can be organized into the following three categories:
(1) : (t; 0; 0; 0) ; (t; 1; 0; 0) ; (t; 2; 0; 0) (2) : (t; 0; i; v) ; (t; 1; i; v) ; (t; 2; i; v) (3) : (t; 1; i; ) ; (t; 2; i; ) .
The …rst category contains the histories on the equilibrium path. The continuation values for the …rst category are:
V i (t; 2; 0; 0) = (2) (T t) V i (t; 1; 0; 0) = (1 exp( e max (T t))) (2) + exp( e max (T t)) (1) c (1 exp( e max (T t))) (T t) V i (t; 0; 0; 0) = exp( e max (T t)) (0) + e max (T t) exp( e max (T t)) (1) + (1 exp( e max (T t)) e max (T t) exp( e max (T t))) (2)
The o¤-equilibrium-path continuation values for the second category are given by:
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The o¤-equilibrium-path continuation values for the third category are given by:
V i (t; 1; i; v) = V 0 + 1 + (1 exp( e max t)) 2 + (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) 3 for = t V 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 for < t V i (t; 2; i; v) = V 0 + 1 + 2 + (1 exp( e max t)) 3 + (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) 4 for = t V 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 for < t.
Note that c > 3 immediately implies that an e¤ort intensity of 0 is optimal when an agent believes that at least two breakthroughs have been produced. This is the case when an agent herself has produced 2 breakthroughs or the agent is at a history where both agents have announced that they have produced a breakthrough. In the remaining cases e¤ort is e max which is optimal provided that the continuation values satisfy:
The implementation decision strategy is optimal provided that V i (t; 2; 0; 0) V 0 + 1 + 2 + (1 exp( e max t)) 3 + (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) 4 V i (t; 1; 0; 0) V 0 + 1 + (1 exp( e max t)) 2 + (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) 3 V i (t; 0; 0; 0) V 0 + (1 exp( e max t)) 1 + (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) 2
Taking the …rst constraint,
[( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) ( e max T + 1) exp( e max T )] 4 + exp( e max t) (1 exp( e max (T t))) 3 .
At t = T the inequality is satis…ed. The derivative of the LHS wrt t is the derivative of the RHS is e max [exp( e max t) 3 + e max t exp( e max t) 4 ] :
which for 0 t <X d is strictly less than hence the inequality is satis…ed for 0 t T X : We may apply the same argument for the other two constraints after noting:
V i (t; 1; 0; 0) (1 exp( e max T )) 2 + (1 ( e max T + 1) exp( e max T )) 3 (T t) V i (t; 0; 0; 0)
(1 exp( e max T )) 1 + (1 ( e max T + 1) exp( e max T )) 2 (T t) .
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This implies that the announcement strategy is optimal as well, V i (t; 2; 0; 0) V i (t; 2; i; t) V i (t; 1; 0; 0) V i (t; 1; i; t)
These conditions are identical to the conditions for the implementation decision strategy earlier.
Finally, for the optimality of implementation decisions after an announcement, we require:
These are all satis…ed as V i (t; ; i; v) = V i (s; ; i; v) and V i (t; ; i; v) = V i (s; ; i; v).
Note that in the proposed equilibrium, the o¤-equilibrium-path belief held by a player when her partner announces that she produced some number of breakthroughs, is that her partner produced two breakthroughs. This o¤-equilibrium-path belief is reasonable, because a player with one breakthrough prefers not to disclose that breakthrough even if she was believed to have one breakthrough. This is true because the best response of the other player would be (i) to implement the project if she had 2 breakthroughs, (ii) to stop exerting e¤ort and to delay if she held one breakthrough, and (iii) to continue exerting e¤ort until she produces one breakthrough and delay if she had 0 breakthroughs. The bene…t of announcing successful breakthroughs for the player with only one breakthrough is that if the other player holds 2 breakthroughs then the project is implemented immediately. The cost is that the other player would no longer exert e¤ort for a second breakthrough after having produced a …rst breakthrough. It is clear that for su¢ ciently short deadlines, the probability that the other player has produced 2 breakthroughs is too low for the bene…t of announcing successful production to outweigh the cost of reducing the e¤ort incentives of the other player. We show this more formally below.
The expected payo¤ from disclosing production of one breakthrough under this scenario equals
(1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) (V 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 ) + ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)V , whereV = V 0 + 1 + exp( e max (T t)) 1 exp( e max T ) ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) 2 + (1 exp( e max (T t)))
is the payo¤ in the event that the announcement is not met with an implementation decision by the other player. In this case, the updated beliefs about the value of the project are exp( e max T ) ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) 2 + 1 exp( e max T ) ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) 3 , where exp( emaxT ) ( emaxt+1) exp( emaxt) and 1 exp( emaxT ) ( emaxt+1) exp( emaxt) are the updated beliefs that the other player will have produced 0 and 1 breakthrough by the deadline given that they have not implemented the project upon receiving the announcement and hence do not have 2 breakthroughs.
Proposition 10. 90 < T <X : V i (t; 1; 0; 0) .
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Proof. Rearranging V i (t; 1; 0; 0) using the expressions above, we obtain emaxt emaxt+1 (1 exp ( e max (T t))) + 1 emaxt+1 (1 ( e max (T t) + 1) exp( e max (T t))) 1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) (T t) + c 4 (1 exp( e max (T t))) ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) [exp ( e max (T t)) 3 + (1 exp( e max (T t))) 4 ] This holds with equality for t = T and holds strictly for t = 0: It su¢ ces to check that for any t 2 (0; T ) the following holds, e max t exp( e max t) 1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) 3 T t 1 exp ( e max (T t)) + c 4
3
.
Since
(1 exp( emax(T t))) T t < 1, this condition is implied by exp( e max t) exp ( e max T )
T t e max t 1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t) 
Note that the RHS of (7) is clearly …nite. Now consider the …rst term on the LHS of (7),
exp( e max t) exp ( e max T ) T t .
This term is decreasing in t and thus has a …nite positive lower bound of 1 exp( emaxT ) T which in the limit T ! 0 approaches e max . Now consider the limit of the second term on the LHS of (7), lim t!0 e max t (1 ( e max t + 1) exp( e max t)) = 1
Hence 9T > 0 such that (7) is satis…ed for all 0 < t T .
B.4.3 In…nite Deadline
To gain some intuition for what may occur a long way from the deadline we consider an equilibrium of the in…nite horizon game. This is done to avoid the complications in a game with a …nite horizon, of specifying the changes in behaviour for the subgames as we transition from behavior far away from the deadline to close to the deadline. The in…nite horizon case allows one to focus on a setting where there is no e¤ect of a future deadline. We show that the equilibrium strategies are similar to the equilibrium strategies in our earlier model far away from the deadline (t < T Y ). We …nd there is immediate revelation of private information about breakthroughs by each individual, w i = n i : Hence, the project is implemented whenever the combined number of breakthroughs reaches 2, d i = implement if n i +w i 2: This is similar to the earlier model whereby the agents immediately implement the project upon a breakthrough. Individuals also exert less than the maximum e¤ort level e i = c < e max as in the earlier model which trades o¤ freeriding incentives with incentives to bring forward the implementation of the project. We formalize this tradeo¤ in the following proposition.
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Proposition 11. A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the in…nite horizon game is As soon as an agent knows that a combined two breakthrough have been produced this results in zero e¤ort as 3 < c . This is true when n i = 2 or when n i = 1 and = i. Otherwise, this non-zero e¤ort strategy is optimal provided that V i (t; 2; i; ) V i (t; 1; i; ) = c V i (t; 2; 0; 0) V i (t; 1; 0; 0) = c V i (t; 1; 0; 0) V i (t; 0; 0; 0) = c V i (t; 1; i; ) V i (t; 0; i; ) = c , which is straightforward to verify from inspection of the continuation values. The decision not to implement the project is optimal provided that V i (t; 1; 0; 0) V 0 + 1 V i (t; 1; i; ) V 0 + 1 V i (t; 0; i; ) V 0 + 1 V i (t; 0; 0; 0) V 0 which is straightforward to verify. For the history (t; 1; i; ), the decision to implement is optimal provided that
